THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF INTRA-SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION: REFLECTIONS ON POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

Fulgencio Lucas SEDA

Abstract

Following the ends of both the war in Mozambique in 1992 and apartheid in South Africa in 1994, migration within the southern African region has gained new shapes as well as new border control responses. This paper analyses border control arrangements that have been put in place to address the escalation in migration across the Mozambique-South Africa border. It is based on in-depth interviews with border police patrollers, immigration officials and customs officers in Mozambique, together with analysis of annual reports from these border divisions. Findings indicate that Mozambique and South Africa have unilaterally prioritized anti-criminal aspects of border control and migration management, and have not prioritized integration of immigrants. Thus, it appears that Mozambique and South Africa have been failing to explore potential advantages anchored in intra-southern African migration, even though these could embody an alternative method for addressing migration, human mobility and border control in the Southern Africa region.

Key words: Intra-southern African migration; border; migration management.

Introduction

The end of the war in Mozambique and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa constituted two major events that converged to produce new patterns of migration in the Southern African region. To respond to this, both the Mozambican and South African governments have unilaterally prioritised restrictive border control measures designed to stop criminals at the border (Gastrow, 2010). In doing so, the Mozambican government has undertaken border control responses focused on deployment of more border patrollers, arrests, and the deportation of immigrants. Likewise, South Africa has prioritised the arrest and deportation of immigrants.
immigrants, accusing them of criminality, fuelling unemployment and spreading disease (Crush, 1999; SAMP, 2014).

While day-to-day practices of border control by both the Mozambican and South African governments have prioritised deterring migrants, who are perceived as a threat to socio-economic stability and security, this paper explores how intra-Southern African migration anchored in a colonial heritage of divided communities embodies a potential alternative for migration management and border control in the region. The paper relies on literature and reports from the Mozambique border authorities as well as in-depth interviews conducted with border patrol officers of the National Commander of Border Police of Mozambique. By combining these sources, the paper explores both the current discourse on migration management and border controls vis-à-vis the day-to-day experiences of border authorities. Findings indicate that primarily, the approach of the Mozambican government to border control has been informed by incursions perpetuated by elements of apartheid during the war. Such a perspective has led to the adoption of tighter border controls, particularly at points identified as potential routes for clandestine border crossings. Subsequently, border police have been able to identify potential migrants and to establish departure points for clandestine immigration. This has strengthened anti-criminal border control responses, although in fact many migrants who use these crossing points have other intentions and needs, such as medical assistance, schools and casual jobs on either side of the border. Similarly, South Africa has not prioritised the social integration of immigrants. Rather, post-apartheid South Africa has perpetuated anti-immigration policies, which has had dire consequences for present day social relations. A lack of legal protection for immigrants, combined with social discrimination, their experiences of police brutality, a lack of respect for their human rights, and the exploitation of immigrant labour, combine to support anti-immigration policies in post-apartheid South Africa (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008; Crush and Dodson, 2007).

The end of the war in Mozambique influenced new migration trends, both transitional and international. In response to new patterns of migration, key reforms were undertaken by the Mozambican government. These led to the establishment of the Mozambique Border Police and key priorities at the border, and to more attention awarded some main immigration routes. The response of the South African government to the escalation of illegal immigration along its border with Mozambique is described. This has included reforms in various sectors of the South African economy. The concept of intra-Southern African migration is proposed as an alternative approach to migration and border controls. An argument is put forward
that with this approach, south-south migration could help both countries explore the advantages of migration, including policies that could help to integrate immigrants.

Transnational and international patterns of migration in post-war Mozambique

Migration patterns across Mozambique are closely related to the end of the war in the country, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the effects of the end of the Cold War (Emerson, 2014). With the end of the war in Mozambique in 1992 and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, the Southern African region has been fully reconnected to the circuits of the global economy. At the same time, more attention than ever has been given to controlling the movements of people across intra-regional borders, giving rise to a sharp distinction between regular and irregular migration, the latter being defined mainly as a response to the powerful attraction for regional migrants of the South African economy (Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005; Raimundo, 2009; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002; Andreas, 2003; Adamson, 2006). In the case of Mozambique, the dominant discourse among academics is that soon after the end of the armed conflict, borders became more permeable to the trafficking of drugs and human beings, to smuggling and to other crimes such as money laundering, homicides, vehicle theft and bank robbery (Chachiua, 2000; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). Press reports constantly point to the Mavalane Airport in Maputo as a transit point for cocaine shipped *en route* from Colombia and Brazil to Europe and East Asia, or for heroin and hashish shipped from Pakistan to Dubai. (Gastrow and Mosse, 2011; 2002).

Concomitantly, post-war Mozambique has been marked by the ‘feminisation’ of migration or the greater visibility of women migrants within the Southern African region (Crush et al., 2005). Women’s visibility in *networks of cross-border migration* in SSA is a new pattern whereby women traders support their dependents including spouses, children and extended families by providing housing, food and funds for the education of children (Peberdy, 2000). From the perspective of state’s concerns with border control, the massive increase in female migration within the Southern African region has also been associated with transnational crime, particularly across the Mozambican-South African border. (Ama, Mangadi, and Ama, 2014; Peberdy, 2000). According to some sources, circuits of transnational crime involve both Mozambican and South African men and women trafficking migrants and refugees from other, third countries across the Mozambican border into South Africa (Crush, 2005:79).
From a socio-economic standpoint, women in international migration flows is not a new phenomenon, although women traders now may constitute the majority of traders crossing the Mozambican-South African border. As studies have shown, their economic activities often support the housing, food and schooling not only for their spouses and children, but also for siblings (Peberdy, 2014; 2000). As contemporary cross-border migration has become more gender-balanced, the active economic roles of these women have become more evident. Thus the flow of women in international migration demands a shift to a migration structure based on their historical and current participation in household decision-making and responsibility. It is important to see that women who migrate still live within their larger household, while, particularly in the context of the Southern African region, men are migrating for periods associated with residence-based labour contracts, particularly in the mining industry in South Africa (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004). Notwithstanding the differences between male and female migration, and the increase in socio-economic-led migration more generally, Mozambique and other states in the region have prioritised national security-driven migration and border control arrangements.

**Preparation for border control responses**

During the war, the Mozambican government was concerned with counteracting the infiltration of apartheid elements into Mozambican territory who were engaged in supplying the opposition rebel movement (known as National Resistance of Mozambique) with weapons, ammunition systems, uniforms, financial assistance, intelligence support and training.

This was described by Emerson (2009:64): “to assist in the infiltration and exfiltration of guerrillas across the Rhodesian Mozambican border, [in 1979] the South Africans supplied some seven vehicles, including heavy duty tracks.” Based on these facts, the Mozambican government’s major priority was to establish a modernised and professionalised army capable of responding to conventional attacks from apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (Chachiua, 2000:55). The intensification of war and penetration of elements of the apartheid regime across the Mozambican borders also led to the signing on 16 March 1984 of the Inkomati Accord of non-aggression and good neighbourliness between the Mozambican government and the South African apartheid regime. The key aim of the Accord was to end the war and its legacies since it was believed that if Pretoria would fulfil its goals under the accord, the intensity of bandit activity would rapidly decline (Davies, 1987). Internally, the government introduced the systematic control of movement of people,
based on four security divisions that were acting within the Immigration Department: economic, ideological, military and counter-intelligence affairs. As a result of these reforms, the immigration department was renamed the National Department for Migration (NDM) and subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. At a later point, the NDM was integrated into the State Intelligence Information Bureau (Serviços de Informação Secreta do Estado SISE). As these reforms were taking place, the Mozambican government created the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) subordinated to the army. These parallel security sectors were established to protect territorial sovereignty, to stop cross-border criminal activities and to prevent populations in the border regions and state-owned properties from the most serious external threats (NDM Report, 1999).

While the government perspective on border control was to fight external security threats (including cross-border crime), the new democratic dispensation began to pressure the country to implement security and legal reforms that would contribute to sustainable democracy, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of the most vulnerable populations (Lalá, 2003). As part of the response to these demands, the National Assembly passed an anti-trafficking law in 2008 aimed at protecting women and children against sexual and labour exploitation. At the level of border management, since 1992, the Mozambican government has given priority to reaffirmation and delimitation of the country’s borders. Reaffirmation is a topographic activity that is conducted using maps and previous border treaties to replace milestones that have been removed or destroyed during a period of war, by animals or by natural phenomena. Delimitation of the border is the description of its line in text, maps or cartographic letters, and it is different from demarcation, which is an indication of the physical alignment of the border in the ground (Brownile, 1987).

In response to the new border dynamics in post-war period, the Mozambican government assigned responsibility for the reaffirmation process to the Institute of the Sea and Borders (IMAF), which coordinates activities with other sectors such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Agriculture and Health. This, the Mozambican President of the Institute of the Sea and Borders stated in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012 that:

the rise in mineral resources discovery that has attracted international firms to invest in the country, which requires clearly delimited borders in order to prevent resources-driven conflicts with neighbouring states, ensure better control of immigration flows, and better protection of states.
It is thus evident that borders are assigned different roles based on the position one takes. For example, as the above comment suggests, delimited borders can establish the legal possession of natural resources to the extent that no other state can make a claim to these resources. From the perspective of national sovereignty, borders of neighbouring states can now be regarded as international rather than transnational, which in turn underpins the tension between border authorities and communities in cross-border (Adepojou, 2006; Adepojou, 2000).

**The establishment of the Mozambique Border Police**

Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, the Mozambican government created the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), which replaced the People’s Police of Mozambique (*Polícia Popular de Moçambique*). Within this reform, the PRM created the Mozambique Border Police (MBP) as a special division assigned to control the border, particularly to prevent cross-border crime and to preserve territorial sovereignty. In 1997, government implemented major reforms in the security sector, in which the erstwhile National Service Public Security (SNASP) was renamed SISE and the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FLM) was renamed the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM).

The FADM are entrusted with preserving national independence, state sovereignty, and the protection of territorial integrity from external threats including armed aggression. For example, the 48th anniversary of the FADM in 2012 was celebrated by the holding officers with their great commitment and readiness to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity (Jornal Notícias, September 20, 2012).

Although the government has constantly implemented reforms in the security sector, the country has not yet achieved visible change, since the police are poorly trained and under-resourced and thus unable to effectively provide public security in this new environment (Alar, 2010; Gastrow and Mosse, 2002). In part, Mozambique has been relying on joint border patrol operations with neighbouring states aimed to address what are believed to be common problems, ranging from clandestine migration and smuggling to poaching. At the same time, the Mozambican border authorities have established simplified crossing points aimed at facilitating socio-economic interaction between communities in restricted border zones of Mozambique and neighbouring countries. A restricted border zone is the territory within the administrative boundaries immediately adjacent to the state border line, the territorial length of which stretches up to 20 km from the official
border line. This area includes Mozambican inland waters, rivers, lakes and islands.

In principle, a simplified border regime allows communities who live in the border areas to cross the border regularly for socio-economic reasons, without being checked automatically. Such reasons may range from family visits, to medical treatment and attendance of ceremonies such as marriages or burials. In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, the National Commander of the Mozambique Border Police observed that individuals crossing through simplified crossing points should carry ID cards, and simply sign a register when moving back and forth across the border. The main reason pointed by the National Commander of Border Police is that simplified borders are not characterised by the same stringent controls as official crossing points, where a passport regime is supposed to be enforced.

However, Mozambique did not receive any cooperation from neighbouring states in implementing simplified border crossing regime, since those countries continued to rely on bilateral agreements aimed at fighting crime (Crush and Dodson, 2007). This has resulted in different regimes of border control and migration management regardless of their inadequacy in the post-colonial African context. In pursuance of regime-based border control, the Mozambican border police also tend to pay little attention to socio-economic convergence factors across border regions.

The Mozambique Border Police border controls priority

With the primary interest lying in fighting cross-border crime, the MBP have become more concerned with the modus operandi of the perpetrators and the categories into which they fall. In an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, the National Commander of the MBP explained that "border violators can be divided into simple violators and criminal-related immigrants". From his perspective, and for the MBP generally, a ‘simple violator’ refers to any immigrant from a neighbouring state who enters Mozambique through a non-official crossing point in search of casual work, medical assistance, a family visit or any other socio-economic need, in other words for any non-criminal purpose. The ‘criminal-related immigrant’ referred to as an unauthorised immigrant, often coming from beyond the borders of neighbouring states, who is involved or suspected of criminal-related activity. These immigrants are defined in categories that range from smugglers, counterfeiters, traffickers to thieves.

Since the MBP are concerned with understanding the modus operandi of those involved in cross-border crime, they have established an internal intelligence
division, which is tasked with conducting a deep trial process with intercepted border violators. In the same interview quoted above, the National Commander of the MBP added that “among asylum seekers, refugees, and deported immigrants, we are always concerned with potential spies, which is why we need more detention centres so that the trial process can be conducted in a more detailed manner”. As well as reflecting a generally hostile attitude towards foreigners, something which is also evident in, for example, approaches to border control in the European Union, this remark suggests that the civil war and the apartheid era has left its mark on the MBP today. As is reflected in the establishment of FRONTEX, which was aimed at stopping asylum seekers and refugees, a further legacy of the era of apartheid has been a heightened suspiciousness of infiltrators from South Africa (Léonard, 2010). The distinction between unauthorised border violators without criminal intent and those whose aims are criminal in the context of the Southern African region is summarised in Table 3.1 below. The distinguishing categories range from nationality, destination, used routes and reasons for relocation.

**Table 1. Categories used by the MBP to classify immigrants crossing Mozambique borders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trial categories</th>
<th>National citizens and foreigners from neighbouring states</th>
<th>Foreigners from other parts of the region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Simple border violators; spies</td>
<td>Illegal immigrants; drug traffickers; spies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Neighbouring countries; livelihoods; firewood; arable land</td>
<td>Economic reasons; transit country; trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used routes</td>
<td>Porosity; common borders; cross-border communities</td>
<td>Porosity; international borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for relocation</td>
<td>Hospital treatment; traditional ceremonies; family visits; informal cross-border trading; smuggling; facilitation of clandestine migration; unsustainable extraction of resources</td>
<td>Spying; terrorism; asylum seekers; refugees; illegal extraction of natural resources; political instability; ethnic or religious conflicts; family reunification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled based on interviews conducted with Mozambique border officials.*

In line with the categories presented in the table above, the MBP understands that immigrants from neighbouring states such as Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe, particularly those who live in the border regions, mostly cross the border for socio-
economic reasons. Regardless of such socio-economically driven border crossing, the MBP believes that immigrants from neighbouring states can be involved in spying, which is why they urge local communities to be vigilant. With regard to immigrants from outside the neighbouring states, the MBP believes that these are mostly economically driven and are closely linked to criminal activities such as trafficking and smuggling. On many occasions, such immigrants try to find a transit country (with less secure borders) to reach their destination. As far as the literature is concerned, Africa is characterised by permanent interaction of people across border regions, but the continent is also viewed negatively as a relatively safe migratory route to Europe, as a result of the permeability and weak monitoring of borders as well as the ease with which false documents can be acquired (Melde et al., 2014; Ramirez, 2009; Ratha and Shaw, 2007). In the context of Mozambique, in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2012, a senior border police officer stated that:

Country of origin is a fundamental element to take into account to the extent that most immigrants who are involved in trafficking and exploitation of natural resources are from non-neighbouring states. Therefore, information on country of origin allows accurate decisions about real reasons leading to the relocation of the immigrant concerned.

Based on the above, the distinction between simple border violators (from neighbouring states) and unauthorised immigrants (from outside neighbouring states) provides the field of migration studies with an alternative discourse that can better differentiate the context of border regions in post-colonial African states from those in Europe. It can also be seen as an emerging discourse in migration studies that can help to distinguish undocumented from unauthorised migrants in the context of intra-Southern African migration. For example, South African authorities understand undocumented immigrants to be those from neighbouring states, including Mozambique. On the other hand, unauthorised immigrants are generally defined in South Africa as being those from the rest of Africa, Asia, Europe and America, more often expected to use illegal routes to reach their destinations (Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush and McDonald, 2000).

On the subject of illegal immigration routes, the MBP accepts that immigrants from beyond the borders of neighbouring states use illegal routes either to reach Mozambique or to enter South Africa (the main destination for immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The map below indicates routes used frequently by unauthorised immigrants (across land and borders), as classified by the MBP over the last few years.
The MBP is thus aware that two inter-related factors have made these routes the most accessible to unauthorised immigration: immigrants’ country of origin and language similarity. With regard to country of origin, the bulk of unauthorised immigrants who are arrested by border patrollers are from Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo and Burundi, reaching Mozambique through Cabo Delgado province (by crossing the Rovuma river). These immigrants can easily reach Pemba and Nampula by flying to Ethiopia or Kenya on scheduled flights. Further, according to the National Commander of the MBP interviewed during fieldwork in 2012, "Mozambique has been targeted by immigrants from the democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and..."
Rwanda as a final destination while South Africa (often via Mozambique) is the final destination sought by immigrants from Ethiopia and Somalia”. He explained that unauthorised immigrants reach Mozambique predominantly across the northern and the central borders. The northern border comprises three provinces, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. The central border includes four provinces, namely Tete, Manica, Zambézia and Sofala. The northern Cabo Delgado Province has become a point of easy entry for unauthorised immigrants into the country, particularly Tanzanians and those who come from the Great Lakes. According to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM), fishermen in Cabo Delgado make illegal crossings of the Rovuma River, using their small boats at night and unloading them in the coastal districts of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga and Macomia. From there, immigrants are directed to other points where they either make their way to other parts of Mozambique on long distance trucks or head to South Africa (AIM, 2012). Although unauthorised Tanzanian immigrants are referred to as simple border violators (since they come from a neighbouring state), the Mozambican border authorities believe that they are also involved in illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly in very remote areas where local authorities are unable to access current patrolling capabilities.

As for language similarity, most immigrants from the countries of the Great Lakes speak Kiswahili, which facilitates East African communication generally and in this case rapid informal integration in the Northern provinces of Mozambique. On many occasions, immigrants are hosted and integrated in local communities by relatives while preparing to migrate to South Africa, a preferred destination for various categories of migrants given its attractive economy and the relatively easy border crossing from Mozambique (Raimundo, 2009).

The political stability since the end of the war in Mozambique has also turned Mozambique itself into a destination for asylum seekers and refugees, especially the Marratane Refugee Centre in Nampula Province in the Northern part of the country. With regard to refugee centres, some members of parliament from the Frelimo and Renamo political parties claim that Mozambique has been unable to control the flow of refugees, which from the perspective of both economics and security has become a burden to the country. For example, a member of parliament from Frelimo Party interviewed during fieldwork in 2012 stated that “with more detention centres, refugees would not be able to mingle with Mozambicans and compete for access to basic services”.


In this context order is interpreted from different perspectives. For example, some members of parliament in Mozambique are of the opinion that strong border control or detention centres can prevent desperate immigrants from entering Mozambique. A similar response occurred in post-apartheid South Africa as a way of discouraging refugees and asylum seekers. In that case, the South Africa Department of Home Affairs proposed the establishment of a detention centre to host asylum seekers while their applications were being processed (Truong et al., 2014; Handmaker, 2001). As the following section argues, in implementing these immigration reforms, the post-apartheid South African government has been reinforcing anti-immigration policies that have impacts ranging from human rights abuse, incitement of violence to xenophobia.

Post-apartheid South African migration management

As noted in previous sections, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of armed conflict in Mozambique resulted in the intensification of both regular and irregular forms of migration across the borders of neighboring states. Accordingly, the Mozambique border authorities have given priority to the control of entry by unauthorised immigrants and cross-border crime. At the same time, the post-apartheid South African government has adopted cross-border management policies guided by national migration and refugee legislation (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Oucho, 2014; Crush et al., 2005). These policy reforms, institutional reforms, and border control arrangements deserve further scrutiny.

Legacies of the past

Prior to 1994, South Africa had very restrictive security-oriented migration policies. As Handmaker and Parsley (2001:42) point out, “the security and control oriented approach was evident in the focus on deterring undocumented migrants and bogus asylum seekers.” By implementing contract-based employment and the Aliens Control Act of 1991, apartheid South Africa was able to control the movements of people (inside the country and from other African countries). In order to limit permanent employment for immigrants and to restrict movement of people from rural to urban centres, immigrants were contracted for a maximum period of two years, after which they could be repatriated (Posel and Marx, 2013; Posel, 2004).

Restrictive migration policies under the apartheid regime were based on the prototype of British colonial policies designed to exclude the entry of Indians, Jews and communists as well as foreign activists and journalists into South Africa (Truong et al., 2014; Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001; Handmaker, 2001). As a
result of massive flows of undocumented immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees (particularly from Mozambique) into the country, South Africa continued to give priority to repatriation operations and strictly controlled entry and residence by immigrants (Meldes et al., 2014). Thus with the dawn of a democratic South Africa, one of their major challenges was the implementation of far-reaching migration reforms aimed at achieving higher standards of administrative justice.

Migration policy reforms

The first attempt to bring about reform of the migration policy in post-apartheid South Africa came in 1995. This was aimed at amending the Aliens Control Act (ACA of 1991). The ACA was considered draconian and an apartheid dinosaur, with policies rooted in racism that perpetuated the violation of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). The major objective of the 1995 amendment was to review the detention period under which people could be held without judicial decision. Where the ACA had established that detained persons could be held in detention indefinitely, the 1995 amendment removed this provision and stipulated that detentions of longer than a period of three days should be reviewed (Oucho, 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). However, the 1995 amendment has not brought any change since the provisions have been applied, pointing to the need for further reforms.

The next attempt to reform migration policy came through the Green Paper on International Migration in 1997 and the Refugee Act of 1998. The point of departure for the establishment of the Green Paper was the lack of protection afforded asylum seekers and refugees, since they could be repatriated at any time. Therefore, the Green Paper fixed a five-year period in which either repatriation of a refugee or the granting of permanent residence in South Africa could occur (Handmaker, 1999). The main objective of the Green Paper was to “provide temporary protection to persons whose basic human rights were at risk in their country of origin, until they could return home safely” (Handmaker, 1999:300). The Refugee Act of 1998 was intended to protect vulnerable groups on a permanent basis in accordance with international practices, reflecting South Africa’s obligations and various international human rights conventions (Donnelly, 2014; Handmaker, 1999). The Green Paper was contested by the Human Rights Commission for its consistent failure to achieve standards for the protection of human rights, particularly with regard to repatriation within five years.

Regardless of people’s expectations of the Refugee Act 1998, its implementation has raised concerns because of its origins in the ACA, thus
representing a continuation of a draconian regime (Melde et al., 2014; Handmaker and Parsley, 2001). Due to this failure, efforts to produce more contextualised migration policies continued in Post-apartheid South Africa. In 2000, the South African Government took into implementation a new Immigration Act, which was later amended in 2004. The immigration Act has embodied a different approach to immigration control, with particular focus on economic-related immigration and a link to border control (inside the country and on the remainder of the border).

In doing so, the Immigration Act of 2000 in its preamble provides that the new immigration control system aims at ensuring inter alia that (1) security considerations when entering South Africa are completely satisfied, including strengthening border monitoring aimed at preventing illegal immigrants and deporting them in cases where they are detected; (2) foreigners promote and contribute to the growth of South Africa’s economy. Based on the current dynamics of migration in cross-border communities, Post-apartheid South African migration reforms contribute to exclude less skilled immigrants and largely desperate immigrants from within the Southern African region. However, some reforms of labour and immigration policy undertaken by the Post-apartheid South Africa have had an impact.

**Integration of immigrants: a losing battle**

**Labour policy**

Despite different attempts to adapt post-apartheid South Africa to a new migration context aimed at establishing a less racialised society and promoting respect for human rights, the country’s migration policies have left many migrant workers from neighbouring countries undocumented and exposed to labour exploitation and police brutality (Trimikliniotis et al., 2008). As Crush and Dodson (2007:451) point out, “since 1994, there has been a growing disconnect between the regional reality of migration and the inherited policy tools which seek to manage those movements”. In the matter of labour migration, post-apartheid South Africa has been plagued by high rates of unemployment, a result of downsizing policies in the mining sector and job restrictions applied to low skilled workers. This has increased hostile sentiments regarding immigrants (Fine, 2014; Spaan, and van Moppes, 2006; Wentzel and Tlabela; 2001; Posel, 2004). For example, the 1996 Amendment Act prescribes that if qualified South Africans are available, South Africa will no longer grant foreign work or immigration permits (Crush, 1999:6). At the same time, South Africa has undertaken further labour adjustments, including the signing of bilateral labour agreements with Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and
Swaziland, aimed at ensuring legal access to South Africa by workers from these states (Fine, 2014; Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Apart from these arrangements, the South African government has made specific recommendations to neighbouring states stating, *inter alia*, that (1) all governments should provide work for their own citizens; (2) problems of immigration can only be solved by a coordinated regional and international strategy; and (3) there should be a fair and proper control of entry of migrant workers into host countries (Melde et al., 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). This suggests that countries in the region that are relatively advanced in terms of economic development, such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, tend to see other states as transit points for unauthorised immigrants on the grounds that those countries’ borders are less well protected and there may be higher levels of corruption among their border officials (Solomon, 1997). Based on this, South African recommendations to neighbouring states could be regarded as a manifesto of hegemonic power in the region, which could seriously undermine mutual coexistence. Moreover, with this hegemonic positioning, other states in the region may find it difficult to cooperate openly in integration on the grounds that they might be dominated by South Africa (Ngoma, 2003).

Against this background, the former Vice President of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki) appealed to South African authorities to look carefully and holistically at causal factors and their potential impact on neighbouring countries. Job losses among mine workers, for instance, could easily intensify clandestine immigration, which in turn would undermine South Africa’s own interests as well as those of neighbouring countries (Crush and Dodson, 2007; Davies and Head, 1995). Despite this concern, South Africa has not yet adopted new immigration policies other than repatriation and securitisation of borders.

**Border control**

As has been highlighted in the previous sections, post-apartheid South Africa’s immigration policies and border controls have prioritised pre-dawn searches and repatriation of immigrants who have irregular status in South Africa. These operations have been implemented under the argument of deterring cross-border crime (particularly trafficking) and have been characterised by police brutality and little respect for human rights, provoking criticism from humanitarian organisations who believe that these acts impair democracy and ignore the rule of law. As Crush *et al.* (2005:25) point out, “arrest, detention and repatriation procedures do not
always protect irregular and regular migrants from abuse and have the potential to cause conflict between neighbouring countries”.

As a result of these practices, the bulk of the literature proclaims that “South Africa’s new democratic government inherited a system of cross-border migration management rooted in the abusive practices of the past, which became in direct conflict with government to transparency, equality, accountability, and fundamental human rights” (Crush, 1999:1).

In the matter of patrol operations, South Africa has raised concerns with its control of its extensive land borders, particularly those with Mozambique, where the border has been electrified and is patrolled by the South African National Defence Force (Melde et al., 2014; Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush, 1999).

Concomitantly, the post-apartheid South African government has increased its budget and resources for police raids and deportation operations including the tracing, arrest and repatriation of refugees and undocumented immigrants, particularly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). As a result, in 1994 the South African immigration authorities deported about 91000 immigrants to Mozambique and Zimbabwe whom they believed to have entered South Africa clandestinely (Oucho, 2014; Oucho and Crush, 2001). As these operations have continued, South African authorities have also begun to deport non-Mozambican foreign immigrants (such as Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Chinese immigrants, as well as people from other parts of the region) on the grounds that they entered the country through Mozambique. This has damaged diplomatic relations between the two states (Melde et al., 2014; Crush, 1999).

Briefly stated, the increase in the budget for restrictive border control measures has not produced sustainable results for the South African government. From the legal perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations have fallen below international standards for the protection of human rights. From an economic perspective, South African arrest and deportation operations cost the government large sums of money, while the impact of this expenditure is nil (Vigneswaran, 2013; Oucho and Crush, 2001). From a socio-economic perspective, the focus on highly skilled immigrants who will meet the country’s economic demands has resulted in the marginalisation of the majority of immigrants, who have had to ‘fight’ for their own survival.

Legal protection of immigrants and social discrimination
While police brutality against immigrants has been quite noticeable in South Africa – examples including police dog attacks on Mozambican immigrants in 2001 (Crush and Dodson, 2007) – negative sentiment about immigrants has grown apace. As far as the literature is concerned, massive arrest and deportation operations have embodied a discourse in which foreign citizens are seen as the cause of high rates of unemployment and crime, and this has sparked conflicts with local citizens (SAMP, 2014; Crush, 1999). One response to this would be the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), an international organisation founded in 1996 in Cape Town aiming at promoting awareness of migration-development linkages in the SADC region. Another is that “South Africa is reported to be experiencing a pronounced and worsening climate of anti-foreigner sentiment, extending to widespread social discrimination, which has occasionally translated into violent attacks” (Handmaker 1999:292).

Examples would include the xenophobic attacks in May 2008 (resulting in several deaths, and destruction and looting of foreigners’ property). Such attacks reflect the fact that post-apartheid South Africa has prioritised selective immigration policies such as economically driven immigration (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Crush and Dodson, 2007).

In the context of refugees and asylum seekers, South African anti-immigration policies have deprived immigrants of several of their rights. For example, section 22 of the Refugee Act of 1998 prescribes that asylum seekers have no right to study or work for 180 days while their status is being processed (Handmaker and Parsley, 2001: 43). Post-apartheid South African immigration policies have tended to move in tandem with Western receiving countries’ models, in which immigrants face tremendous difficulties in achieving social integration ranging from shrinking opportunities for language instruction, xenophobia and racist public opinion concerning immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014).

While post-apartheid South Africa’ responses to immigration have resulted in violations of human rights, discrimination and raised anti-foreigner sentiment, its policy makers seem also to have failed to explore migration policies adequate to inherent changes (Vigneswaran, 2013; Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 1999). Importantly, new migration trends in the context of post-colonial states challenges policy makers and border authorities to think in a concept of intra-Southern African migration. This concept is grounded in the historical context of migration between Southern Africa states. Moreover, it can be better understood in the context of south-
south migration as an alternative to migration management in an ongoing process of regional integration in SADC.

In the case of the Southern African region, as table 3.2 below illustrates, the socio-economic and ethno-cultural factors of cross-border interaction stand as fundamental features of intra-Southern African migration. These deserve further discussion towards finding an alternative approach to migration studies in the region. Cross-border interactions can offer an alternative to migration management, and offer an alternative to the current international standards of border control, which are fundamentally designed to criminalise and restrict movements across international borders. Intra-Southern African migration might then diverge from the criminal-migration nexus of border control.

Prospect of intra-Southern African migration: a response to anti-immigration policies

Up to this point, this paper has considered various legal and institutional reforms implemented since the end of the war in Mozambique and the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and the impact of these on the movements of people. Evidence from the literature indicates that these reforms have perpetuated anti-immigration ideology and have led to the spread of xenophobic sentiments about foreign immigrants (Boucher and Gest, 2014; Fine, 2014; Handmaker, 1999).

However, as table 3.2 below illustrates, migration flows from and within the Southern African region are marked by local dynamics of border crossing intertwined with the effects of the ends of war and apartheid and by historical labour migration to South Africa. These require a deeper analysis of the usefulness of international models of border control that seek to lock down borders against so-called unwanted immigrants across Western countries. By focusing on migration from and within the Southern African region, an alternative to international models of border control could emphasise the views of local people in cross-border regions rather than the sovereignty that concerns nation states (Asiwaju, 2011).

In the case of migration from and within the Southern African region, communities living in cross-border regions interact on both sides of the border on a day-to-day basis for different reasons, particularly reasons related to socio-economic needs. As the table illustrates, since the end of the war in Mozambique cross-border interaction has increased and local communities have been able to expand their informal trade activities across borders to access water, firewood and arable land, all vital to their livelihoods. As this cross-border interaction has tended to intensify,
variations have occurred in border control regimes from country to country. These variations in border control (weak, strong and very strong) are related to each country’s material capacity to monitor the border, and at the same time in all variation, states have tended to develop similar concerns about border control that are often in conflict with the concerns of the local population. In short, these regimes of border control reflect states’ perspectives of border security, which do not differentiate between transboundary socio-economic interactions and cross-border crime, particularly poaching, illegal exploitation of mineral resources and smuggling.

Table 2 Key interaction factors shaping intra-Southern African migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries bordering Mozambique</th>
<th>Border length (km)</th>
<th>Transboundary ethnic/linguistic groups</th>
<th>Transboundary legally trafficked goods</th>
<th>Transboundary illegally trafficked goods</th>
<th>Transboundary prominent concerns</th>
<th>Security regime type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Makonde; Yao</td>
<td>Fabrics; consumer goods; electronic items; bicycles and spare parts</td>
<td>Minerals; timber</td>
<td>Poaching; illegal extraction of minerals; smuggling; illegal migration</td>
<td>Weak: extensive with few patrol units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Emacua; Chiyao; Chichewa</td>
<td>Maize; beans; salt; vegetables; soft drinks; bicycles, motorbikes and spare parts; mattresses</td>
<td>Fertilisers; firewood; timber; bamboo; rustled cattle; alcohol</td>
<td>Smuggling; land disputes; illegal fishing; felling of trees</td>
<td>Weak: very extensive and porous border; land-oriented border crossings; limited control capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historically, the discovery of minerals in Witwatersrand and in Kimberley stimulated labour migration by creating a demand for a labour force from several neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Uganda (Fine, 2014; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2001). This migration has always been economically driven, which is a crucial factor underlying intra-Southern African migration. For example, following the end of the war in Mozambique and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Goods Smuggled</th>
<th>Goods Stolen</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Nyanja; Nyungwe</td>
<td>Dried fish; maize; beans; potatoes; plastic items; fabrics; soft drinks</td>
<td>Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes; minerals; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Smuggling; illegal migration; porous; search for livelihoods on both sides of borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Shona; Manhyka</td>
<td>Sugar; maize flour; rice; meat; milk; soap</td>
<td>Bales of second-hand clothes; spirits; cigarettes; minerals; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Smuggling; illegal migration; illegal extraction of minerals; water for agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Swazi; Chichangana</td>
<td>Meat; maize flour; potatoes; tomatoes; clothing; shoes</td>
<td>Rustled cattle; stolen vehicles; firearms</td>
<td>Strong: Patrolled border; economically oriented crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Tsonga; Chichangana; Zulus</td>
<td>Meat; maize flour; shoes; clothes; plastic items (chairs, tables; bowls, basins); soft drinks; mattresses</td>
<td>Cosmetics; drugs; stolen vehicles; firearms; spirits; cigarettes; rustled cattle</td>
<td>Smuggling; trafficking; illegal migration; poaching of rhinos; rustled cattle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collated by the author on the basis of interviews in the field
the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, immigrants from other Southern African countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe began to look for alternative destinations such as Mozambique and Botswana for trade opportunities and better living conditions. This gave new impetus to regional economies and represents a resource for local populations (Ama et al., 2014; Peberdy, 2000).

The renaissance of migration from and within the Southern African region, the concept of intra-Southern African migration, can be expressed in the idea of South-South migration, i.e. migration that occurs between developing countries or regions (Melde et al., 2014; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009). Broadly speaking, there are different categories or interest and scholarly approaches to South-South migration employed by international organisations and by individual scholars, which which makes this concept rather fuzzy. The categories range from geographic area to national income and Human Development Index (Bakewell, 2009). To mention two examples, for the World Bank Development Indicators, developing countries are characterised by low income, low levels of human capital and economic vulnerability (Bakewell, 2009). Conversely, for Stefania Donzelli, South-South migration has been intensified by globalisation and by the increase in regional agreements on the free movements of people (Donzelli, 2013).

Given the diversity of perspectives, it seems that south-south migration might be better explored in the context intra-southern Africa migration, in which issues related to push-pull factors, poverty and social protection as well as sustainable utilisation of transboundary resources are central to the migration-development nexus. Accordingly, Southern African countries could use a more reconciled approach to border, aimed at the building of a more interconnected society in which the exchange of skills and culture better reflects the needs of communities divided by the legal lines of state borders. Evidence from the field indicate that local inhabitants tend to view migrating foreigners from the perspective of partnerships and skills exchange for local development. For example, in an interview conducted during fieldwork in 2013, a resident in the Ressano Garcia community (Mozambique-South Africa border) stated that “people from the great lakes have shown different experiences by introducing container-based grocery shops, which are now common in the country”.

In the Machipanda community (Mozambique-Zimbabwe border), local residents understand that Zimbabwean immigrants (who come in search of jobs) have skills in areas such as construction and plumbing, from which they can benefit. In the same perspective, a senior immigration officer interviewed during fieldwork
in 2012 stated that “it is relatively easier to hire and pay relatively low wages to persons from developing countries rather than European worker”. Such comments imply that intra-Southern African migration may arise as an alternative concept in the context of post-colonial Africa. It may help deconstruct socio-economic development from the perspective of post-colonial cross-border communities on issues related to use of transboundary resources, petty trade, and ethnic networks (Melde et al., 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

However, as has been emphasised in the previous sections, Mozambique and South Africa together with other Southern African states have prioritised border controls that have tended to view immigration as a threat rather than as an opportunity, and this has prevented them from incorporating migration management into social policy frameworks such as poverty reduction (Hujo and Piper, 2014; Hujo and Piper, 2007; Crush et al., 2005). Instead, each country in the Southern African region has been concerned with the control of immigrants in terms of “who is allowed to enter the country, for what purposes and under what conditions, but fundamentally also about the settlement and integration of migrants who intend to remain in the country” (SAMP, 2014:5).

This notion can be separated into two strands of integration: economic and political. From the perspective of economic integration, states in the Southern African region may need to explore the core values and potential contribution of immigration to their development strategies (SAMP, 2014). As the literature makes evident, states may need to refrain from regarding immigrants as a threat and instead treat them as an opportunity (Adjai and Lazaridis, 2014; Sablonnière et al., 2013; Crush et al., 2005). At the practical level, they may need to work with local communities and immigrants to establish development strategies in which nationals and immigrants participate, to facilitate and strengthen both immigrant integration and the hosting communities and countries.

In terms of political integration, development strategies established to achieve the integration of immigrants can contribute to social cohesion and the building of a national identity beyond cultural similarities and territorial belonging. From this perspective, social cohesion and national identity mean more than living together in the same neighbourhood; they include how foreign immigrants are integrated into local communities (SAMP, 2014).

Southern African countries may need to view borders as points of contact rather than as barriers, particularly since modern borders are no longer be confined by
political geography and territorial identity, owing to the volatile nature of these subjects (Newman, 2006a; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). Moreover, state border officials, particularly in the context of post-colonial border regions, need to be adaptive and adaptable to security complexities influencing global policing. This represents a structural demand in that states and communities in the border regions may need to frame a concept of security that balances socio-economic, cultural and sovereignty interests.

Conclusion

Despite considerable efforts by both the Mozambican and the South African border authorities in combating irregular forms of migration, cross-border migratory flows have not declined. It is clear that the Southern African region has not yet explored the meaning of day-to-day interaction among cross-border communities in ongoing policies and practices of border control between neighbouring states. The prevailing ethno-cultural affinities of communities divided by the political boundaries, together with economic differences between neighbouring states, have led to new trends in migration that demand new approaches. In pursuance of this objective, this paper has examined border control strategies adopted in post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa, and the driving forces that have led to these strategies.

It is clear that the Mozambican government has implemented several reforms aimed at keeping the border protected against unauthorised immigration and cross-border crime it views as serious threats to security (such as human trafficking, smuggling and the illegal exploitation of natural resources). Further, the reconnection of South Africa to global chains of transaction has resulted in the implementation of migration reforms that have punished the majority of unskilled labour migrants from rural Southern Africa and from neighbouring states. Post-apartheid South African migration policies and border control strategies have continued the segregation policies of the past when dealing with migrants, particularly those from neighbouring countries.

Above all, neither Mozambique nor South Africa has yet been able to implement migration management based on day-to-day interactions in the cross-border regions. As a result, both use borrowed practices as an alternative to more locally grounded migration policies for the Southern African region.
References


Adamson, F. (2008) Constructing the diaspora: diaspora identity politics and transnational social movements, Annual Meeting of the ISA,


Crush, J., V. Williams and S. Peberdy 'Migration in Southern Africa', *Global Commission on International Migration Policy Analysis and Research Program (September 2005):* 1,


Donzelli, S. (2013) Migration, the Global South, and Migrant Women Workers in the Field of Border Studies: Theoretical Approaches, Themes of Inquiry. *International Institute of Social Studies Erasmus University Rotterdam*. Working Paper 571, November 2013,


Seda / The political context of intra-southern African migration: reflections on post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa

www.ijceas.com


